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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 22, 1972 the United States Senate passed the
Equal Rights Amendment.1 It has been sent to the states for
ratification 2-nearly 50 years after its initial introduction in
1923.3 The Amendment provides:
(1) Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
(2) The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article.
(3) This amendment shall take effect two years after the date
of ratification.4
The Amendment is intended to shift legal classifications
based on sex to classifications based on individual attributes.
"The law may operate by grouping individuals in terms of exist-
ing characteristics or functions, but not through a vast over-
classification by sex."5 Even where it is demonstrated that some
characteristic is found more often in members of one sex, there
is no justification for different legal treatment of the sexes un-
1. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REc. 4612 (daily
ed. Mar. 22, 1972) [hereinafter cited as H.R.J. Res. 208]. The House of
Representatives passed the Equal Rights Amendment on October 12,
1971. See 117 CONG. REC. 9392 (1971).
2. Although as of March 3, 1973, 28 states had approved the
Amendment, informed observers were indicating that there is consider-
able doubt whether the additional ten states needed for ratification
would take favorable action in the foreseeable future. See N.Y. Times,
Mar. 3, 1973, at 14, col. 3.
3. For a chart of the legislative history of the Amendment, see
Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 981
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown et all. See also Martin, Equal
Rights Amendment: Legislative Background, 11 J. FAmmy LAw 363
(1971).
4. H.R.J. Res. 208. Although the details of judicial interpretation
of the Amendment cannot be known until the courts begin to rule on
its effect, the intent of Congress has been clearly formulated. The re-
port of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, S. REP. No. 689, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); the minority report (of Congressman Don Ed-
wards and 13 other members of the House Judiciary Committee) of
the house report on the Equal Rights Amendment, H.R. REP. No. 359,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); and the extensive debate on the Amendment
on the floor of the Senate, 118 CONG. REc. 4372-4612 (daily eds. Mar.
21-22, 1972), provide a general framework for judicial interpretation.
5. H.R. REP. No. 359, supra note 4, at 6 (separate views of Con-
gressman Edwards, et al.).
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der the Equal Rights Amendment.' Different treatment would
result in a denial of equality of rights on the basis of sex for
those persons who do not fit within the statistical norm. Thus,
for example, a law prohibiting women from jobs requiring the
lifting of weights in excess of 30 pounds would be considered an
over broad classification based on sex, as there are members of
both sexes who can lift such weights without injury and mem-
bers of both sexes who cannot. A law could, however, constitu-
tionally prohibit from employment all those unable to lift
weights in excess of 30 pounds.
Two exceptions to the Amendment appear in the legisla-
tive history. First, intermingling of the sexes is not required
where the right of privacy dictates that the sexes be separated,
such as in private bathroom facilities.7 Included in this excep-
tion is "the traditional power of the State to regulate cohabita-
tion and sexual activity by unmarried persons."8
This principle would permit the State to require segregation of
the sexes for these regulatory purposes with respect to such fa-
cilities as sleeping quarters at coeducational colleges, prison
dormitories, and military barracks.9
Second, reasonable classifications based on characteristics truly
unique to one sex are not proscribed.10 The legislative history
of the Amendment indicates, however, that this exception should
be given the narrowest possible effect." Only where character-
6. Id.
7. Id. at 7.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. "For example, a law providing for payment of the medical
costs of child bearing could only apply to women." Id.
11. See note 4 supra. The amendments to the Equal Rights
Amendment that were proposed and defeated on the floor of the Sen-
ate may also clarify congressional intent. These amendments, intro-
duced by Senator Ervin, include one which would have exempted all
state and federal laws which "extend protections or exemptions to
women." No. 1068, 118 CONG. REc. 4531 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1972); an
amendment which would have exempted from the coverage of the
Amendment any law which imposed responsibility upon fathers to
support their children. No. 1069, 118 CONG. REc. 4538 (daily ed. Mar. 22,
1972); and an amendment which would have exempted all laws which
distinguished between men and women if the distinction "is based on
physiological or functional differences between them." No. 472, 118
CONG. REc. 4551 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1972) (emphasis added). Because
the phrase "functional difference" was left ambiguous, such language
would have permitted a court to use a much more liberal test to de-
termine whether a law was constitutional under the Amendment than
it could under the language of the Amendment as finally enacted. For
example, if a husband's role as the wage earner were seen as a func-
tional difference, a statute which required that only the husband had a
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istics are clearly found only in members of one sex will a classi-
fication be constitutional.12
All states 3 have laws which would likely be found uncon-
stitutional- under the Amendment Although Minnesota has
fewer such laws than the majority and has several laws spe-
cifically forbidding sex discrimination,14 many Minnesota stat-
duty of support would be held constitutional. For the result on this
question under the Amendment as enacted, see text accompanying notes
23-33 infra.
12. L. KAwOWITS, THE LAw SCHOOL CuRncummuz AND Tm LExGAL
RiGHTs OF WoVME: PRoPEEry 15 (mimeo) (1972) states:
It is clear from the legislative history of the federal ERA
that, except in those rare and narrowly defined circumstances
where discernible sex-based biological differences clearly jus-
tify sex distinctions in the law, the Amendment would ab-
solutely prohibit any official discrimination or distinction based
upon sex. Thus, it has been suggested, that under the Equal
Rights Amendment certain distinctions based upon sex, such as
a state's regulation of wet nurses and sperm donors, would
continue to be permissible. The reason for this is that these
biological differences inhere in the very nature of the sexes.
But if a state attempts to distinguish between the sexes
merely on the basis of statistical probability or widespread
generalization, it would violate the equal rights principle.
13. The Amendment, of course, reaches only state action and not
purely private action. H.R. REP. No. 359, supra note 4, at 7. Thus the
Amendment would reach federal and state laws, and actions which
come within the realm of "state action." The determination of whether
or not an act is state action under the Equal Rights Amendment would
follow the case law developed under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
14. MmNN. STAT. § 363.03(1) (1971) forbids discrimination in em-
ployment on the basis of sex. MnN. STAT. §§ 181.66-.68 provide that
employees must receive equal pay for equal work without regard to sex.
In addition, a few Minnesota statutes have recently been amended so
that they apply equally to men and women. These include the ali-
mony statute which formerly defined alimony as "an award made in a
divorce proceeding of payments from the future income or earnings of
the husband for the support and maintenance of the wife only." MnN.
STAT. § 518.54(3) (1967). In 1969 this subdivision was amended to read,
"'Alimony' means an award made in a divorce proceeding of payments
from the future income or earnings of one spouse for the support and
maintenance of the other." Minn. Laws ch. 1028 § 2 (1969). The MAn-
nesota Child Custody statute was also revised in 1969. Prior to that
time no mention was made of the effect of the sex of the parent on
child custody awards upon divorce. MnN. STAT. § 518.17 (1967), as
amended, MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1971). In 1969, the following sentence
was added:
In determining the parent with whom a child shall remain, the
court shall consider all facts in the best interest of the children
and shall not prefer one parent over the other solely on the ba-
sis of the sex of the parent.
Mnum. LAws ch. 1030 (1969).
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently altered Minnesota's com-
mon law rule on loss of consortium. The traditional common law rule
had been that, while the husband had an action in tort for loss of con-
sortium with his wife, a wife had no action in tort for the loss of her
1973]
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utes and common law rules would likely be held unconstitu-
tional if the Amendment is ratified. Since the judicial system
can provide only a limited response to a determination that a
law is unconstitutional, such challenges will present difficult
problems for the judiciary. Courts may either invalidate the
statute or extend its application to members of both sexes.1"
The legislative branch, on the other hand, is equipped with the
power to deal completely and efficiently with the complex policy
issues involved in revising a large body of statutory and com-
mon law and could avoid numerous case by case challenges
through statutory revision. Section three of the Equal Rights
Amendment allows the Legislature time to accomplish that task
by delaying operation of the Amendment for two years after
ratification. This note will deal with those Minnesota statutes
and common law rules which are most likely to be brought un-
der judicial scrutiny if the Amendment is ratified, and will sug-
gest alternatives for legislative revision which could fulfill the
requirements of the Amendment.
II. THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP
The Equal Rights Amendment will probably have its great-
est impact on statutes and common law doctrines dealing with
the relations of husband and wife. Much of the law of domestic
relations is based on the assumption, deeply entrenched in the
husband's services. Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W.
154 (1935). In Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170
N.W.2d 865 (1969), the court, in holding that a wife has a cause of action
for loss of consortium, stated:
[T]he wife's right to maintain an action for loss of consortium
is now recognized in numerous jurisdictions. This results from
recognition of the equal status of the partners in the marriage
relationship and a rejection of the medieval concept that the
husband had a proprietary right to his wife's services, mainly
domestic service, but that the wife, as the property of her hus-
band, had no reciprocal right to his.
284 Minn. at 511-12, 170 N.W.2d at 868 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
15. If the latter alternative is selected, there may sometimes
be a question as to the proper basis for equalization. ...
In determining the impact of a constitutional provision upon
a non-conforming statute, courts look primarily to the legisla-
tive intent behind the statute in question. Whether the statute
falls completely or is modified in some way depends upon the
court's assessment of what the legislature itself would have
done had it known that all or part of its original enactment
would be invalid. Of course, such legislative intent is often not
easily ascertained. Where legislative history is scant, or lack-
ing altogether, there is little for courts to rely on except their
own judgment about what the legislature must have intended.
Brown et al., supra note 3, at 913-14.
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common law, that the husband is the legal head and wage earner
of the family and the wife is the child rearer and keeper of the
home.16 Laws which give legal effect to this supposition assign
husband and wife different rights and duties. They do not des-
ignate obligations on the basis of existing characteristics or func-
tions, but purely on the basis of sex.17 Unless these laws fall
within one of the two narrow exceptions to the Amendment, 8
they will violate its general mandate.
A. HIsTORiCAL PERSPECTIVE
Late in the nineteenth century, the legislature enacted Min-
nesota's version of the Married Women's Act.10 The act was in-
tended to partially abrogate the common law doctrine of cover-
ture, which declared that upon marriage a woman's legal identity
was merged with that of her husband, and she could not con-
tract, sue or be sued, convey land, or enter into a business. -0
Married Women's Acts were enacted throughout the United
States in order to place married women in an equal legal posi-
tion with single women, primarily in the areas of property and
contract relations.21
The language of the first section of the Minnesota Married
Women's Act is sweeping:
Women shall retain the same legal existence and legal per-
sonality after marriage as before, and every married woman
shall receive the same protection of all her rights as a woman
which her husband does as a man, including the right to appeal
to the courts in her own name alone for protection or redress
22
16. See H. CLAR, LAw OF DorSdxsc RELATIONS 181 (1968).
17. The legislative history of the Equal Rights Amendment makes
it clear that laws that distinguish between men and women cannot
stand even if it can be demonstrated that some characteristic or func-
tion is found more often in one sex than another. See note 11 supra.
18. See text accompanying notes 7-12 supra.
19. MIRN. STAT. ch. 519 (1971).
20. Kanowitz, discussing Married Women's Acts, points out that
[tJhough the precise wording and scope of these statutes varied
from state to state, they were all products of conscious and de-
liberate legislative efforts to redress property and contract re-
lations between wives and husbands and to remove previous
procedural disabilities of married women.
L. KANOwnzm, Wo~mn AND THE LAW: THE UNrnmSHED REVOLUTiON 40
(1969). See also I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in the
law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is
suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated
and consolidated into that of the husband ....
21. L. KANowrm, supra note 20 at 40.
22. MinK. STAT. § 519.01 (1971).
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However, judicial interpretation has limited the scope of this sec-
tion and other portions of the Married Women's Act.2 3 Only
property and contract rights are affected by the Act.2 4 And be-
cause the Minnesota Supreme Court has not had occasion re-
cently to deal with the broad issue of the effect of the Act on
common law doctrines affecting the marriage relationship, many
common law doctrines, such as those affecting domicile, a mar-
ried woman's name, and the husband's duty of support, retain
their validity. In addition, different treatment of husband and
wife remains in inheritance tax and minimum marriage age laws.
B. MArinor WomEN AND THE DUTY OF SUPPORT
Section 519.05 of the Married Women's Act 25 provides that
a wife shall not be liable for the debts of her husband and that
a husband shall not be liable for "any torts, debts or contracts
of his wife, committed or entered into either before or during
coverture. . . ." Further, the husband and wife are jointly and
severally liable for all necessary household articles furnished to
and used by the family.26 However, the husband is liable for
"necessaries" furnished to his wife "where he would be liable at
common law. ' 27 Thus, although the statute expressly incorpo-
rates the common law rule that imposed a duty upon the hus-
band to support his wife,28 there is no reciprocal obligation
placed on the wife. Further, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
23. See State v. Arnold, 182 Minn. 313, 315, 235 N.W. 373, 374
(1931); Friburk v. Standard Oil Co., 66 Minn. 277, 68 N.W. 1090 (1890).
24. See cases cited in note 23 supra.
25. MnMN. STAT. § 519.05 (1971) states:
No married woman shall be liable for any debts of her husband,
nor shall any married man be liable for any torts, debts, or
contracts of his wife, committed or entered into either before or
during coverture, except for necessaries furnished to the wife
after marriage, where he would be liable at common law.
Where husband and wife are living together, they shall bejointly and severally liable for all necessary household articles
and supplies furnished to and used by the family.
26. Id.
27. Id. What constitutes "necessaries" has been the subject of
much discussion. See generally, Paulsen, Support Rights and Duties
Between Husband and Wife, 9 VAND. L. REv. 709, 736 (1956). In Bergh
v. Warner, 47 Minn. 250, 50 N.W. 77 (1891), the Minnesota Supreme
Court stated:
The term "necessaries," in its legal sense, as applied to a wife, is
not confined to articles of food and clothing required to sustain
life or preserve decency, but includes such articles of utility, or
even ornament, as are suitable to maintain the wife according
to the estate and rank of her husband.
Id. at 252, 50 N.W. at 78.
28. See Boland v. Morrill, 275 Minn. 496, 148 N.W.2d 143 (1967).
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held that the husband has a duty to provide necessaries for his
wife even though she has independent means.20 In addition, the
court has held that although the wife may be held liable to third
parties for debts incurred in the purchase of household articles,
the husband can be held liable to his wife for reimbursement
unless the wife has voluntarily used her own funds to make the
purchase, with no expectation of repayment. 30
Minnesota statutory and case law, therefore, provides two
separate duties of support: 1) the husband is bound under stat-
utory law31 to support his wife and may be held liable for her
purchases charged to his credit where the items purchased are
"necessaries" and he has failed to purchase necessaries for her
and failed to provide her with the means to purchase them her-
self; and 2) as between husband and wife, the husband is ul-
timately responsible for the support of the family.32  Both sup-
port obligations will likely be violative of the Equal Rights
Amendment as they place a burden of support on married men
which they do not place on married women. The classification
is based on sex and does not fall within the narrow exceptions
29. See Rotering v. Hibbard, 168 Minn. 502, 210 N.W. 395 (1926).
30. See Kosanke v. Kosanke, 137 Minn. 115, 162 N.W. 1060 (1917).
In that case, a widow sued the estate of her deceased husband for re-
imbursement of money she paid for household expenses during her
husband's lifetime. The husband had repaid her for a portion of her
expenditure. The court rejected the estate's contention that, as § 519.05
makes husband and wife jointly and severally liable for all necessary
household articles, the wife was "merely paying her own debt and
[was] not entitled to reimbursement therefor." Id. at 116, 162 N.W.
at 1060. The court held:
Although this statute makes both husband and wife liable to
third parties for [household] necessaries, it does not relieve the
husband from the duty to support the family which has rested
upon him from time immemorial, and as between husband and
wife the duty to furnish such necessaries still rests upon the
husband.
Id.
31. Mnx. STAT. § 519.05 (1971).
32. See note 30 supra. See also Peterson v. Swan, 239 Minn. 98,
57 N.W.2d 842 (1953). The wife's ability to enforce her right to support
in an ongoing marriage is severely constrained. The law does not
grant a woman the right to obtain a cash allowance from her husband;
it does allow a wife to use her husband's credit, but if he has notified
local businessmen not to allow purchases on his credit, they will be
hesitant to accommodate the wife. In such circumstances, the wife is
left with no method of obtaining cash support from her husband short
of separation. See Paulsen, supra note 27, at 735-40. See also McGuire
v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953), where the Nebraska
Supreme Court articulated the general rule that a court will not award
support to a wife in an ongoing marriage.
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of the right of privacy or unique physical characteristics. 3 The
statute is apparently based on the presently unwarranted as-
sumption 34 that the husband is always the sole wage earner in
the family and the wife is always the keeper of the home."
The statute could be revised to provide that neither spouse
shall have an obligation to support the other, or alternatively
that both spouses have a support obligation. Under the latter
scheme, where one spouse earns family income and the other
contributes domestic services, the former has the obligation. Al-
though the first alternative would be permissible under the
Amendment, it would hamper family life. Creditors would be
unwilling to extend necessary credit to a spouse earning no in-
come but providing household services. As long as it is common
for one member of a household to provide most of the income,
while the other provides uncompensated personal services, such
as child rearing,36 the law should insure that the spouse who re-
ceives no direct payment for his or her contribution to the fam-
ily unit has a protectable interest in the income of that unit.
The alternative of placing a mutual burden of support on
husband and wife is therefore more desirable. The Association
of the Bar of the City of New York has outlined the effect of
such a statute:
[I]f spouses have equal resources and earning capacities, each
would be equally liable for the support of the other-or in
practical effect, neither would be required to support the other.
On the other hand, where one spouse is the primary wage earner
and the other runs the home, the wage earner would have a
duty to support the spouse who stays at home in compensation
for the performance of her or his duties. 37
The wording of such a statute need not be complicated. It could
provide simply that
Every man shall support his wife, and his children. Every
33. See text accompanying notes 7-12 supra. See also Brown et al.,
supra note 3, at 945; BAR AssocIATIoN OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT
ON THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1971).
34. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
35. Courts have been unwilling to recognize that this basic assump-
tion simply does not apply in many cases. See Hill v. Commissioner,
88 F.2d 941 (8th Cir. 1937). Rather, it is a classification which bears
little relationship to the economic reality of the modern American fam-
ily, where almost 50% of all wives are in the labor force and 38% of
all mothers with children under 18 years of age were in the labor force
in March 1967. WOMEN's BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BULL.
No. 294, 1969 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WoRKERS 37.
36. This family pattern may be changing. See note 35 supra.
37. BaR AssoCIATION OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, supra note 33, at 8.
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woman shall support her husband and her children.3 S
The statute could further provide, in the language of the present
MVinnesota statute, that
Where husband and wife are living together they shall bejointly and severally liable for all necessary household articles
and supplies furnished to and used by the family.39
The rights and liabilities of the spouses inter se would be con-
trolled by the first provision. Thus, a husband could not be re-
quired to reimburse his wife for necessary articles which she
purchased for the household if she had financial resources of her
own, as she would simply be fulfilling her obligation of sup-
port.40 The second provision would require that the property of
both husband and wife be subject to debts incurred by the pur-
chase of household articles from third parties.4 1 The doctrine
that, as between husband and wife, the husband is ultimately re-
sponsible for such debts would presumably be abrogated.4 2
Although in the forseeable future women will more often
need the protection of such a statute, the husband will have a
protectable interest in her income in those cases where it is the
woman who is the primary earner. Further, the wife would not
38. The language of this provision is modeled in part on § 2-3
of the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act which provides that
Every man shall support his wife, and his child; and his parent
when in need.
Every woman shall support her child; and her husband and her
parent when in need.
The Act itself would be unacceptable under the Equal Rights Amend-
ment, as it places an unequal support burden on the husband. The
husband is under a duty to support his wife at all times, while the wife
must support her husband only when he is in need.
39. Mmx. STAT. § 519.05 (1971).
40. Upon divorce, property purchased for the household would be
divided between the spouses according to the procedure established
in MmN. STAT. § 518.58 (1971):
Upon a divorce for any cause, or upon an annulment, the court
may make such disposition of the property of the parties ac-
quired during coverture as shall appear just and equitable, hav-
ing regard to the nature and determination of the issues in the
case, the amount of alimony or support money, if any, awarded
in the judgment, the manner by which said property was ac-
quired and the persons paying or supplying the consideration
therefor, the charges or liens imposed thereon to secure pay-
ment of alimony or support money, and all the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case.
41. It should be emphasized that this liability is limited to neces-
sary household articles. Purchases made by one spouse for his or her
own personal use would not come under this provision. However, if
the personal article is a "necessary" such as clothing for the spouse,
the other spouse could be held liable if he or she were the sole wage
earner, and therefore had a duty of support.
42. See discussion of past judicial interpretation of this provision
at text accompanying note 30 supra.
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be able to avoid financial responsibility for her own support in
those families where husband and wife contribute equally to the
total family income.
Another alternative would be to provide that husband and
wife have vested rights in the total earnings and property of
the family unit. Such a proposal was made in 1963 by the Com-
mittee on Civil and Political Rights of the President's Commis-
sion on the Status of Women: 43
[T]he Committee concludes that during marriage each spouse
should have a legally defined and substantial right in the earn-
ings of the other spouse and the real and personal property ac-
quired as a result of such earnings, as well as in the manage-
ment of such earnings and property. Such right should sur-
vive in the event of its termination by annulment, divorce, or
death. This policy should be appropriately implemented by
legislation which would safeguard either spouse against im-
proper alienation of property by the other.44
The Minnesota legislature could look to the community property
states for guidance in this area.45  However, community prop-
erty systems are not without inequalities based on sex and ma-
jor modifications of that system would thus be necessary. 40
43. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, COMMITTEE
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, Recommendation 14, at 18 (1963).
44. Id.
45. In comparing community property and common law property
systems, it has been said:
That the community system was far superior to the former
barbarous common law system few would deny. Whether that
superiority exists when comparison is made with the modern-
ized common law system, with its ameliorative Married Wom-
an's Property Acts, is a debatable question. To a large extent
one's views will be shaped by his prejudices and judgments of
marriage as a sociological institution. In favor of the commun-
ity system it may be urged that it gives realistic recognition to
the contributions made by both spouses to the material success
of the marriage. Moreover, as a legal system it is, perhaps,
more accurately reflective of actual marital customs and usages
than its rival system. It has been asserted, with considerablejustification, that the community idea exists extra-legally to a
substantial degree in the common law states. Broadly speaking,
the community system may be said to constitute a de jure rec-
ognition of a de facto marital partnership.
2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 7.5 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
46. For extensive discussion of the effect of community property
laws on women, see J. YOUNGER, COMMUNITY PROPERTY, WOMEN AND
CURRICULUM (mimeo) (1972). For example, most community property
systems give the husband sole power of control over the property and
income of the community. ARIz. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 25-211B (1956); CAL.
Crv. CODE § 5125 (West 1970); IDAHO CODE § 32-912 (1963); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2404 (West 1971); NEv. REv. STAT. § 123.230 (1967); N.M. STAT.
AN. § 57-4-3 (1962).
A community property bill has been introduced in New York and is
designed to assure equal rights and duties for husband and wife. A
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A community property system is more representative of the
realities of the American family since it recognizes the contribu-
tion of both partners to the marital relationship. It would more
effectively minimize dependence of the nonearning spouse on his
or her mate. Because of its complexity, however, enactment
would require more extensive revision of Minnesota law than
would imposing a duty of support upon both husband and wife.
Hopefully, either alternative would encourage the further de-
velopment of individualized treatment of men and women under
the law, the ultimate purpose of the Equal Rights Amendment.
C. MAmTAL AGE REQUIREMENTS
Section 517.02 provides that a male may marry without par-
ental consent at age 21, and with parental consent at 18. A fe-
male may marry without parental consent at 18 and with par-
ental consent and the approval of a juvenile court judge at 16.4 7
The distinction between males and females present in section
517.02 and other related statutes48 is one which is common
throughout the United States.49  It is based in large part on
English common law, which in turn was based on assumptions
as to different ages of physiological maturity of males and
females. 50
The statute would be open to challenge as violative of the
Equal Rights Amendment since it provides a lower minimum
description of the bill is contained in 2 Wo1m-Ns RIGHTs LAw REPow=
17 (1972). For the most complete version of the bill itself see Assem-
bly No. 10741.
47. MnN. STAT. § 517.02 (1971) provides in pertinent part:
Every male person wto has attained the full age of 21 years,
and every female person who has attained the full age of 18
years, is capable in law of contracting marriage, if otherwise
competent. A male person of the full age of 18 years may, with
the consent of his parents, guardian, or the court, as provided
in Minnesota Statutes, Section 517.08, receive a license to
marry. A female person of the full age of 16 years may, with
the consent of her parents, guardian, or the court, as provided
in Minnesota Statutes, Section 517.08, receive a license to
marry, when, after a careful inquiry into the facts and the sur-
rounding circumstances, her application for a license is approved
by the judge of the juvenile court of the county in which she
resides ....
48. Mmx. STAT. § 517.02 (1971); MINw. STAT. § 517.08 (1971).
49. Brown et al., supra note 3, at 938. See also L. KANowrrz, supra
note 20, at 10.
50. "The common law ages of consent-14 for males, 12 for fe-
males-represented estimates of the ages when children became physic-
ally capable of producing children." Brown et al., supra note 3, at 938
n.138. Although the age of consent has been increased for both males
and females, the differential between the ages for males and females
has remained.
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marriage age for women than for men.51 As the minimum mar-
riage age is well above the normal age of puberty, it cannot be
argued that the legal distinction rests on biological differences
between the sexes. One arguable rationale for the distinction is
that women mature mentally and emotionally earlier than
men. 5 2 Although this may hold true as a generalization, it "is
such a relative and subjective concept that a court could never
use it as a test for an inborn characteristic distinguishing all
women from all men. ' 53  Such a justification for the law in-
volves the kind of averaging which is forbidden by the Equal
Rights Amendment.54 Another equally unacceptable rationale is
that males should not be distracted during adolescence by the
responsibilities of marriage. 55 Although this argument could be
used to justify a higher marriage age for both males and females,
since women could be equally distracted by such responsibilities,
it cannot be advanced as a reason for imposing a higher minimum
on one sex than on the other. It seems quite likely, therefore,
that if the Amendment is ratified and the Minnesota minimum
marriage age statute is subsequently challenged, a court would
find that the law classifies and assigns different legal rights and
duties on the basis of sex.5 6 Because the sex based distinctions
do not fall within either of the narrow exceptions to the general
rule of the amendment, 57 the law would be invalidated.
Although the legislature is constitutionally free to choose
any minimum age so long as it applies to both sexes,5 8 it will
51. Brown et al, supra note 3, at 938. See also discussion of the
constitutional tests likely to be applied under the Equal Rights Amend-
ment at text accompanying notes 7-12 supra.
52. Brown et al., supra note 3, at 939.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See text accompanying notes 7-12 supra.
58. Several states presently have equivalent age requirements for
males and females. As of December 1, 1969 the following states re-
quired the same minimum age for males and females for marriage
without parental consent: Connecticut (21), Delaware (19), Florida
(21), Georgia (19), Kentucky (18), Louisiana (21), Michigan (18), Mis-
sissippi (21), Nebraska (21), North Carolina (18), Ohio (21), Pennsyl-
vania (21), Rhode Island (21), South Carolina (18), Tennessee (21), Vir-
ginia (21) (changed to 18 in 1971, see note 70 infra), West Virginia (21),
and Wyoming (21). The following states required the same minimum
age for males and females for marriage with parental consent: Col-
orado (16), Connecticut (16), Kansas (18), Maine (16), Missouri (15),
North Carolina (16), Pennsylvania (16), Tennessee (16), and Washing-
ton (17). See generally WOMEN'S BuREAu, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
MARRIAGE LAWS AS OF DECEMBER 1, 1969.
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have to resolve competing policy issues before making a determi-
nation as to the proper minimum age. There are data which in-
dicate that marriages of parties between 18 and 21 are more
likely to end in divorce than marriages contracted when the
parties are over 21.59 However, the national trend in other areas,
such as voting rights,60 has been to lower the legal minimum age
requirement to 18. In a number of states the legal age of adult-
hood has been lowered to 18.61 The drafters of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act provided for marriage without consent
at 18 years of age for both sexes. 62 In a society where 18 year
olds are being given increasing amounts of freedom of choice
and increasing responsibility, it would seem that the choice of
age 18 for marriage without consent is the proper one.
Parental and judicial consent requirements will also require
revision since Minnesota law provides different minimum ages
and procedures for males and females.0 3 Girls are allowed to
marry at 16 with parental and juvenile court consent, 04 while
boys are allowed to marry at 18 with parental consent.65 The
59. See Monahan, Does Age at Marriage Matter in Divorce?, 32
SocI-AL FoRcEs 81 (1953), and Spotlight on Marriage, in M. SussNAN,
SOURCEBOOK ON MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 3, 12 (1963).
60. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXV.
61. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.42 (1972):
(a) Unless a different meaning appears from the context: ...(3) The word "adult" shall be construed to mean a person
eighteen years of age or over.
62. UNIFoRm MARRIAGE AND DrVORcE Ac § 203 (1970).
63. MINN. STAT. § 517.02 (1971).
64. Id. Foote, Levy, and Sander indicate that:
In administering the statute, the Juvenile Court of Hennepin
County (Minneapolis) requires that the applicant, her prospec-
tive spouse, their parents, and their clergyman answer a ques-
tionnaire about the parties, their backgrounds, and the chances
for success of their marriage. The applicants are given a full
physical examination; a probation officer interviews them and
their parents and makes a full report to the court. The ques-
tionnaire to the applicants includes such items as: "How many
school dances and parties attended together during last year';
"Presents exchanged last Christmas, birthday (given and re-
ceived"); "When first discuss marriage"; "Give prospective
spouse ring." The parents are asked to evalute their child's
prospective spouse (eg., "Is that person as intelligent as your
child?"), to describe the future educational needs of their child
and the couple's financial prospects, and to assess their feelings
about the applicant's pregnancy ....
The Probation Officer handling these applications believes
that most of the couples who do not receive Juvenile Court
permission go immediately to South Dakota and get married in
that state by lying about their ages.
C. FOOTE, R.. LEVY & F. SANDER, CAsES AND MATERAms ON FmmI LAW 225
(1st ed. 1966).
65. MiNw. STAT. § 517.02 (1971).
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Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act permits marriage with par-
ental consent or judicial approval at 16 for both sexes, and al-
lows marriage under the age of 16 with parental consent and ju-
dicial approval.6 6 Despite the fact that most sociologists agree
that marriage at these ages has very significant risks,6 7 this
would seem to be an acceptable legislative choice.
D. LEGAL NAME
Although no Minnesota statute requires a married woman
to adopt her husband's surname, the common law rule is that a
married woman's name consists of her given name and her hus-
band's surname. 68 Commentators disagree as to whether the re-
quirement that a woman adopt her husband's name at marriage
has the force of law or is merely a tradition or custom. Brom-
ley69 states in his book on English family law that "[b]y custom,
on marriage a wife assumes her husband's surname and, if he is
a peer, his title and rank. °70 However, the United States Su-
preme Court in a recent case 7' affirmed without opinion a Fed-
eral District Court decision 72 rejecting a claim that an unwritten
Alabama regulation requiring married women to use their hus-
bands' surnames in driver's license applications was a denial of
equal protection. In light of this decision, it seems likely that if
the common law rule in Minnesota7 3 were challenged on equal
protection grounds the Minnesota Supreme Court would accord
the rule the force of law.
Because the common law rule requires a married woman to
adopt her husband's surname, the rule is contrary to the clear
intent of the Equal Rights Amendment since it defines a duty
66. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT §§ 203, 205 (1970).
67. See Monahan, supra note 59, at Table 3.
68. Hughes, And Then There Were Two, 23 IAsTn Gs L.J. 233
(1971). See also Brown v. Reinke, 159 Minn. 458, 199 N.W. 235 (1924).
69. P. BROMLEY, FAMILY LAW (4th ed. 1971).
70. Id. at 95. See also State ex rel. Krupa v. Green, 114 Ohio
App. 497, 177 N.E.2d 616 (1961).
71. Forbush v. Wallace, 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
72. 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971). The court supported the
notion that the question of a married woman's name is a common law
rule rather than a mere custom.
73. In a recent unreported decision, Judge Douglas Amdahl of the
Hennepin County District Court allowed a married woman to change
her last name to her maiden name with permission of her husband.
Minneapolis Tribune, April 18, 1972, at IA cols. 7&8). However, that
case is quite different from one in which a woman asserts the right to
retain her maiden name upon marriage without submitting to the offi-
cial name change procedure.
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solely in terms of sex.74 The legislature has several options if
it wishes to draft a statute consistent with the Amendment's pro-
visions. It could require that husband and wife bear the same
name, leaving it up to the couple to select an acceptable name.
Under this system, a couple could choose to be known by the
husband's name, the wife's name, or by some third name (which
could be a hyphenation of their names). A second alternative
would be to grant a woman the option of retaining her maiden
name at the time the marriage license issues, a procedure similar
to one passed in Wisconsin in 1969. 75 Under this procedure a
woman's name would be part of the public record of her mar-
riage, and she could produce her copy of the appropriate form
if questions arose as to her legal name. A third legislative al-
ternative is a statute which would allow persons upon applica-
tion for a marriage license to choose a family name, or, alterna-
tively, to elect to retain their previous names. This procedure
combines the first two alternatives and would allow the greatest
latitude. A couple could choose any name for the family name,
or retain their own names.
The first suggested option has the advantage of retaining the
tradition of the "family name" while at the same time avoiding
the presently discriminatory practice of requiring that the hus-
band's name be used. Such a system further avoids the problem
of establishing a procedure for the name of children. Children
would take the official family name, whether it were the hus-
band or wife's surname, or a third name. However, this system
does not allow flexibility for situations where both husband and
wife, for whatever reasons, find it essential to retain their own
74. The problem of a married woman's legal name is a real one.
A woman who chooses to retain her maiden name upon marriage
may encounter serious difficulty when she attempts to register to vote,
to obtain a driver's license, and to obtain credit. In addition, a legal
requirement that a woman use her husband's name involves a sym-
bolic deprivation of the individual identity of the married woman.
75. Wisconsin Assembly Bill No. 781 (1969). The Governor vetoed
the bill. WIscoNsN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, BuLL. No. 70-3, THE
ExEcuvmv VEToEs IN WISCONSIN 24 (1970). The bill provided:
(1) Any woman named on a marriage license may, at the time
the license is issued, elect to retain her maiden name or other
p ermissible previous name. Such election shall be made in
wting and signed by her on a form provided under S. 245.20
and shall be attached to the copy of the marriage license re-
tained by the county clerk(2) A name retained by a woman under this section shall be
that woman's name for all legal purposes including business af-
fairs and elections to public offices.
This alternative would require that the woman assume the hus-
band's surname if she did not exercise the option.
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surnames. As more women enter the professional world they
will find it advantageous to retain the name under which they
have become known.76 Further, in a society in which 455 out of
every 1000 marriages are destined for divorce,7 it is possible
under the present single name requirement for a person to go
through several name changes, which results in loss of identity
and administrative confusion. The first option would perpetuate
this inefficiency.
The second option, a statute similar to one passed and ve-
toed in Wisconsin, has been subject to serious criticism. The
governor in his veto message stated:
[T] o my knowledge, this legislation is unique. Both by custom,
and legally, since the time of Edward IV, the wife has taken
her husband's surname as her own.
Our property, commercial and domestic relations law is
based on this premise. The enactment of this legislation would
necessitate alternation of law, legal forms, contracts and data
processing procedures. It could lead to practical difficulties in
landlord and tenant relations, service of papers, determination
of claim of title and ability of law enforcement agencies to de-
termine the whereabouts of individuals.1 8
Most of this criticism is not persuasive. Virtually all identifi-
cation procedures in our society are based on numbers rather
than names. Forms might simply be altered to allow both par-
ties to enter their last names. Further, whether a person is
known by Mary Doe or Mary Roe does not significantly affect
identification procedures if one name is used consistently and
exclusively. Allowing a person to keep the name she has used
all her life would arguably result in less administrative confu-
sion than the name change presently required upon marriage.
This system does, however, present a difficult problem in
naming children where a couple chooses to retain separate
names. It is clear that a statute which required that the chil-
dren's last name be that of the father would be suspect under the
Equal Rights Amendment,7 9 as would a provision requiring that
the mother's name be adopted. The choice of a last name could
76. A woman in public or professional life stands to suffer a
real loss of recognition if she alters her name upon marriage,
particularly if there are successive marriages.
Kay, Text Note on Married Woman's Loss of Identity 3, in H. KAY, R.
LEVY, C. ATTwooD, K. GEHRELS, MATERIALS PREPARED FOR THE AALS
SYMPOSIUM ON THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF
WOMEN: FAMILY LAW MATERIALS (1972) (mimeo).
77. New York Post, July 6, 1972, at 23, col. 5.
78. WISCONSn, LEG sLATVE REFERENCE BUREAU, supra note 75.
79. See text accompanying notes 5-12 supra.
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be left to the discretion of the parents, just as first names are se-
lected. However, this might result in litigation between parents
unable to reach a mutually satisfactory decision. Courts would
be hard pressed to establish rational rules upon which to resolve
such intra-family conflicts. One solution is a statutory presump-
tion that the last name of a child whose parents had different
last names would be a hyphenation of their names. The pre-
sumption would prevail in the absence of a choice acceptable
to both parents.
The third legislative alternative, allowing the couple to
choose a family name or retain their separate names, appears to
be the most attractive. It is likely that most couples would choose
a family name for the sake of convenience. However, such a
statute would allow for those situations where a person for pro-
fessional or other reasons wishes to retain her or his name. This
scheme, like the second option, would require a statutory method
for the naming of children where husband and wife retain sep-
arate names.
Two Minnesota statutes dealing with names would also re-
quire revision in order to be within the provisions of the Equal
Rights Amendment. Section 259.10, which sets out the statu-
tory procedure for changing names, provides that a married man
may have his name and the names of his minor children and his
wife changed if the wife joins in the application."0 There is no
procedure for a married woman to change her name or the names
of her children. Further, there is no requirement that a mother
concur in a father's request to change the names of his minor
children. If the Amendment is ratified it will be necessary to pro-
vide that a married man or woman may independently change
his or her name, but that the names of minor children cannot be
changed without the concurrence of both parents so long as they
remain married.
Section 518.27, which provides that a court may change the
name of a woman who sues for divorce,81 should also be revised
80. MuN. STAT. § 259.10 (1971) states:
A person who shall have resided in any county for one year
may apply to the district court thereof to have his name, the
names of his minor children, if any, and the name of his wife, if
she joins in the application, changed in the manner herein speci-
fied. He shall state in his application the name and age of his
wife and each of his children, if any, and shall describe all
lands in the state in or upon which he claims any interest or
lien, and shall appear personally before the court and prove his
identity by at least two witnesses ....
81. MAnui. STAT. § 518.27 (1971) provides:
When a decree of divorce from the bonds of matrimony is
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to allow a married man to change his name on divorce if he
changed his name upon marriage.8 2
E. A MARRIED WOMAN'S DOMICILE
The common law rule in Minnesota is that a married wom-
an's domicile is that of her husband, unless she is separated from
him for cause.8 3 A person's domicile affects his or her right to
vote, right to pay in-state tuition at state universities and col-
leges, and rights to sue and be sued in federal court.8 4 In addi-
tion, the husband's right to fix the family's domicile means that
if the wife fails to join him without cause she may be charged
with desertion.8 5 The rule as to a married woman's domicile is
similar to the rule applied to children in that both classes of
persons are assigned a domicile by operation of law.80 The wife's
domicile is with her husband, the child's with his parents. 7 On
the other hand, men have the right to choose a domicile.88 Thus,
while as a general rule a man's domicile is determined by where
he lives and has a present intention to remain, a married wom-
an's domicile lies wherever her husband lives, even though he
lives in a different state.8 9
granted in this state, such decree shall completely dissolve the
marriage contract as to both parties. In all actions for a divorce
brought by a woman, if a divorce is granted, the court may
change the name of such woman, who shall thereafter be
known by such name as the court designates in its decree.
82. See text accompanying notes 74-80 supra.
83. Harer v. Harer, 153 Minn. 317, 190 N.W. 343 (1922) (husband
has right to select domicile, but the choice must be exercised with
reasonable consideration for wife); Taylor v. Taylor, 177 Minn. 428,
225 N.W. 287 (1929) (there are circumstances in which the wife may
make a qualified refusal to join husband at his chosen domicile).
But see State ex rel. Larson v. Larson, 190 Minn. 489, 252 N.W. 329
(1934) (wife may acquire separate domicile on judicial decree of
divorce or separation); and Op. ATr'Y GEN. no. 273, 218 (1922) (wife may
have different domicile for voting purposes).
84. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMEsTIc RELATIONS 145 (1968).
85. Taylor v. Taylor, 177 Minn. 428, 431, 225 N.W. 287, 288 (1929).
86. The other type [of domicile] is the domicile by operation
of law, the domicile assigned to a person who has not legal
capacity to choose a domicile, such as the unemancipated mi-
nor, the married woman (in some states), or the mentally in-
competent person.
H. CLARK, supra note 84, at 145.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. For example, husband and wife live in different states by
mutual agreement; husband in state X and wife in state Y. Wife's legal
status is controlled in large part by the laws of state X. She may not
be allowed to vote in state Y, or to claim state Y as her domicile for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, or to pay tuition as an in-state student
at the state university in Y, even if she has been a life-long resident
of Y.
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This rule represents another vestige of the common law doc-
trine of coverture 0 Because husband and wife were one, they
were deemed to have the domicile of the husband, and the hus-
band had the sole right to determine that domicile. Some courts
have justified the retention of this antiquated rule on the ground
that society has an interest in encouraging family unity and that
therefore a family should be allowed only one legally recognized
domicileY1 Although this may be a desirable goal, the fiction
that a married woman's domicile is her husband's runs counter
to the dictates of the Equal Rights Amendment, as it gives mar-
ried men the right to choose a domicile while it gives no such
choice to the married woman. The objection that a law allow-
ing husband and wife to establish separate legal domiciles en-
courages family dissolution 92 is not convincing. It is unlikely
that a couple's decision to establish different homes is influenced
by the fact that they might lose certain rights or might experi-
ence legal inconveniences. It is more probable that a couple must
separate because of job transfer, school commitment, or military
obligations. As the rule is based on a sexual classification and
does not fit within the narrow exceptions allowed under the
Amendment,"3 it would likely be judicially invalidated. 4
Although no Minnesota statute codifies common law domi-
cile, it would be wise for the Minnesota legislature to expressly
abrogate the rule as it revises other discriminatory statutes. Al-
though it is uncommon for a couple to live apart as a matter of
choice,95 a statutory provision for establishing a married person's
domicile would be appropriate in order to clearly establish a mar-
ried woman's right to take advantage of the services of the state
in which she lives.
The legislature has two alternatives in drafting a domicile
statute. First, it could require that every family have one offi-
cial domicile. The choice of domicile would be a matter between
husband and wife, and the husband's place of residence would
not automatically dictate the domicile of the wife. Because of
the possibility of marital disagreement, such a statute would
90. L. KANowrrZ, supra note 20, at 47. See also Brown et al., supra
note 3, at 941.
91. See Younger v. Gianotti, 176 Tenn. 139, 142, 138 S.W.2d 448, 449
(1940).
92. IL CLARK, supra note 84, at 146.
93. See text accompanying notes 7-12 supra.
94. Brown et al., supra note 3, at 941.
95. Other than situations where they are legally separated or
divorced.
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probably be as impractical as the present common law rule. The
second alternative and the better choice would be a statute
which allowed each married adult to establish his or her own do-
micile. If husband and wife were living apart for any reason,
each could establish his or her own domicile for all legal pur-
poses. The question of children's domicile where parents are
living apart could be handled in an equally straightforward man-
ner. Domicile would be determined by the domicile of the par-
ent with whom the child was actually living or by the domicile
of the parent that had legal custody.20
F. INHERITANCE TAX EXEMPTIONS
Minnesota statutes allow a widow a $30,000 inheritance tax
exemption, while a widower may claim only a $6,000 exemp-
tion 9 7 The legislative rationale behind the substantial inequal-
ity in the size of the exemption most likely was that married
women generally have fewer total assets than married men. Al-
though these assumptions are probably correct in a large num-
ber of cases,98 they result in an overbroad classification, as
there are cases where women leave substantial estates to hus-
bands who do not have the means or the health to provide for
themselves.
Court-ordered relief from this discriminatory exemption
scheme would be limited. A court could allow both widows and
widowers a $6,000 exemption or a $30,000 exemption. 9 The more
likely choice for a court would be the $30,000 exemption, as this
would extend a benefit to men rather than reducing a benefit to
women.10 0 The Minnesota legislature, on the other hand, is not
limited to either figure. Whether it chooses to allow a substan-
tial tax exemption for all surviving spouses depends upon its de-
termination of the many complex policy issues, involved in in-
96. Brown et al., supra note 3, at 943.
97. MINN. STAT. § 291.05 (1971) provides in part:
The following exemptions from the tax are hereby allowed:
(3) (i) Property or any beneficial interest therein of the clear
value of $30,000 transferred to the widow, shall be exempt.
(5) Property or any beneficial interest therein of the clear value
of $6,000 transferred to the husband, any adult child or other
lineal descendant of the decedent ... shall be exempt.
98. The income of women workers is about 60 percent of men
worker's income. See WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
BULL. No. 294, 1969 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS 133.
99. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
100. See L. KANOwITz, THE LAw SCHOOL CURRICULUM AND THE LEGAL
RIGHTS OF WOMEN: PROPERTY 16 (1972) (mimeo).
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heritance tax law. 01 However, if the Amendment is ratified,
the legislature must revise the statute if it wishes to avoid judi-
cial extension or limitation of the exemption.
III. LABOR LEGISLATION
A. PRoTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLATION
1. History
Virtually every state has laws which provide special treat-
ment for women workers. Many of these were originally passed
at the turn of the century to protect women workers from the
inhuman working conditions and long working hours of facto-
ties.10 2 The growth of state protective legislation for women was
in part due to early United State Supreme Court decisions such
as Lochner v. New Yorkl' 03 which held that states could not
pass protective legislation aimed at all workers. In Muller v.
Oregon104 advocates of such legislation were able to convince the
Court that women as a class were in need of such protection, and
that the state's interest in protecting women outweighed any
interference with the individual's right to contract in his labor
relations. The Court upheld a maximum hours law which ap-
plied to females only, noting that:
The two sexes differ in body structure, in the functions to be
performed by each, in the amount of physical strength, in the
capacity for long-continued labor, particularly when done stand-
ing, the influence of vigorous health upon the future well-
being of the race, the self-reliance which enables one to assert
full rights, and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for
subsistence. This difference justifies a difference in legislation,
101. The major issue, of course, is whether the legislature wishes
to allow more people to obtain a higher exemption from the inheri-
tance tax, which would be the result of allowing both widows and
widowers the $30,000 exemption. Such a change in the law will cost
the state revenues in the form of inheritance taxes. Balanced against
that may be a desire to allow widows and widowers to hold on to the
bulk of the family income and assets, without heavy taxation, in order
that their remaining years be more economically secure.
102. See Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 Before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 729 (1970) for a summary of vari-
ous states' protective labor law provisions. Protective labor legislation
was also the result of pressure by male workers wishing to protect
their own position:
In many cases, men who saw their own occupations threat-
ened by unwelcome competitors, demanded restrictions upon the
hours of work of those competitors for the purpose of rendering
women less desirable as employees.
J. KELY, SoiM ETmcAL GAns THROUGH LEGISLATION 133 (1905).
103. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
104. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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and upholds that which is designed to compensate for some of
the burden which rests upon her.105
The Supreme Court later rejected the thinking of cases
such as Lochner and held that states and the federal government
could indeed enact protective labor legislation for all workers.100
But the legacy of Lochner remained, and protective labor legis-
lation aimed solely at women and children remained in force in
all states.107
The Equal Rights Amendment has been attacked on the
grounds that it will reverse the hard-fought struggle for wom-
en's protective labor legislation. 08 Certainly some of the pro-
tective labor laws, such as maximum hours and minimum wage
legislation, had as their origins a desire to protect women work-
ers. Other forms of such legislation, however, particularly those
state laws that banned women altogether from certain types of
employment, were perhaps directed at controlling the supply of
workers in order to insure higher wages for the men who worked
at those jobs.10 9 Whatever the motivation for the legislation, it
has become clear that protective labor legislation for women
often prevents women from advancing from the lowest paying
jobs where they are presently concentrated. 1 0 One commen-
tator states:
[E]ven aside from the question of the motivation for the leg-
islation, a closer examination of the legislation will show that
it often actively hurts women, and fails to help where help is
105. 208 U.S. at 422-23.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1940).
107. See note 102 supra.
108. See the testimony of Kenneth A. Meiklejohn, Legislative Rep-
resentative of the AFL-CIO, printed in Hearings on S.J. Res. 16 Be-
fore the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at
465. Mr. Meiklejohn expresses the fear that the practical effect of the
Equal Rights Amendment will be to destroy protective labor laws
rather than to extend them to men.
109. See J. KELLY, supra note 102, at 133.
110. Speaking of minimum wage laws applied to women only,
one commentator states:
More important, the existence of [such] laws applying to
women only in 7 States should not be allowed to obscure the
fact that such laws simply do not deal with the real problem
for women-exploitation by being underpaid and funneled into
the lowest-paying, most menial jobs of our society. (Women
constitute more than 75% of the total employed in the following
fields: Bookkeepers; cashiers; dressmakers, seamstresses; house-
keepers, private-household; nurses, professional; office-machine
operators; operatives, apparel and accessories; operatives, knit-
ting mills; practical nurses; schoolteachers; stenographers, typ-
ists, and secretaries; telephone operators; waitresses.) Preserv-
ing minimum wage laws for women has only resulted in a situa-
tion where full-time employed women earn about 60% of what
full-time employed men earn.
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needed. The most obvious harm is that both categories of State
legislation [laws conferring supposed benefits and laws prohib-
iting women from work in certain jobs] have been used as an
excuse not to hire women or not to promote them to better
paying jobs."'
In recent years, state labor laws enacted to "protect" women
have been threatened by federal law. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964112 prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sex.113 Partially in response to Title VII, ten states have re-
pealed their maximum hours legislation for women." 4 Federal
District Courts have struck down maximum hour legislation in
five states as in conflict with Title VII." 5 In thirteen jurisdic-
tions, attorney generals' opinions have concluded that their
hours laws are not applicable to employers covered under Title
VII. 116
Title VII, however, has not completely eliminated discrimi-
natory legislation. Procedures for challenging such laws are
cumbersome"17 and, in addition, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission policy limits the application of the relevant provi-
sions of Title VII to situations where an employer wishes to raise
a state protective labor law as a defense to a charge of employ-
ment discrimination."l 8
S. Ross, SEx DiscsnuNATioN AN "PRoTEcTivi?' LABOR LzISLATION, printed
in Hearings on Sec. 805 of H.R. 16098 Before the Special Subcommittee
on Education of the Committee on Education and Labor of the House
of Representatives, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 596 (1970).
111. S. Ross, supra note 110, at 594. For a description of the recent
case law in the area see id. at 599.
112. §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970).
113. See Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 H1ARv. L. REv. 1109 (1971).
See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.1-.7 (1972).
114. Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey,
New York, Oregon, Vermont, Wisconsin. 118 CoNG. Rlc. 4403 (daily
ed. Mar. 21, 1972).
115. California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania. 118
CONG. REc. 4404 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1972).
116. California, District of Columbia, Illinois, Kansas, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin. 118 CONG. Rsc. 4403 (daily
ed. Mar. 21, 1972).
117. Under Title VII an employee who believes he or she has been
discriminated against can bring a complaint to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission [hereinafter EEOC]. After protracted hear-
ings and attempts to negotiate a settlement, a complainant may get a
finding of probable cause from the Commission, at which point he or
she may sue the employer. See note 113 supra.
118. The EEOC guideline states:
(1) Many states have enacted laws ... with respect to the
employment of females....
(2) The Commission believes that such State laws and regu-
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2. Protective Labor Legislation in Minnesota
Enactment of Title VII has had no substantial effect on Min-
nesota protective labor legislation. The Equal Rights Amend-
ment, on the other hand, would have an immediate effect on
laws which apply exclusively to women workers. These include
a maximum hours law," 9 a weight lifting statute,1 20 and sev-
eral health and safety regulations. 1 2 1  If the Equal Rights
Amendment is ratified, the Minnesota Supreme Court's response
to these laws will probably be to invalidate those that restrict a
woman's participation altogether in an occupation and extend to
men those laws which now confer special benefit on women
only:1
22
In general, labor legislation which confers clear benefits upon
women would be extended to men. Laws which are plainly ex-
clusionary would be invalidated. Laws which restrict or regu-
late working conditions would probably be invalidated, leaving
the process of general or functional regulation to the legisla-
tures.123
a. The Maximum Hours Law
The Minnesota law regarding maximum work hours for
women provides in part:
No female shall be employed in any public housekeeping,
manufacturing, mechanical, mercantile, or laundry occupation,
lations, although originally promulgated for the purpose of pro-
tecting females, have ceased to be relevant to our technology
or to the expanding role of the female worker in our economy.
The Commission has found that such laws and regulations do
not take into account the capacities, preferences, and abilities
of individual females and tend to discriminate rather than pro-
tect. Accordingly, the Commission has concluded that such
laws . . . will not be considered a defense to an otherwise es-
tablished unlawful employment practice or as a basis for the
application of the bona fide occupational qualification excep-
tion.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(b) (1972).
119. Mmn. STAT. § 181.18 (1971).
120. MiNN. STAT. § 183.25 (1971).
121. Mmx. STAT. §§ 183.24, 182.09, 182.06, 182.44 (1971).
122. See S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 15 (1972):
Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment will result in
equal treatment for men and women with respect to labor laws
of the States, as in other legal matters. This will mean that
such restrictive discriminatory labor laws as those which bar
women entirely from certain occupations will be invalid. But
those laws which confer a real benefit, which offer real protec-
tion, will, it is expected, be extended to protect both men and
women. Examples of laws which may be expanded include
laws providing for rest periods or minimum wage benefits or
health and safety protections. Men are now sometimes denied
the very real benefits these laws offer.
123. Brown et al., supra note 3, at 963.
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or as a telephone operator, for more than 54 hours in any one
week.124
Because the maximum hours statute applies only to women
workers, and does not fall within the narrow exceptions to the
general rule of the Amendment,125 it would likely be declared
unconstitutional 126 A court could either strike down the law
in its entirety or hold the law applicable to both men and
women. 1 27 Since the latter holding would have a drastic effect
upon the labor market in Minnesota, it is likely that a court
would strike down the law rather than expand its coverage.
The legislature may wish to preserve some form of maximum
hours legislation applicable to both sexes, however, and could
revise section 181.18 accordingly. 2 8
The President's Commission on the Status of Women 2 0 and
the Minnesota Governor's Commission on the Status of Women
have repeatedly recommended changes in state maximum hours
legislation. 30 The Committee on Protective Labor Legislation
of The President's Commission on the Status of Women has rec-
ommended (for both sexes) a maximum workweek of 48 hours
124. MNn. STAT. § 181.18 (1971). The statute also provides excep-
tions in certain emergencies, and in certain occupations:
Sections 181.18 to 181.23 shall not apply to cases of emer-
gency in which the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the
public may otherwise be affected, or to cases in which night
employees may be at a place of employment for no more than
12 hours and shall have opportunity for at least four hours of
sleep, or to employees engaged in the seasonal occupation of
preserving perishable fruits, grains, or vegetables, where such
employment does not continue over a longer period than 75
days in any one year, or to telephone operators in municipalities
of less than 1,500 inhabitants. Upon application by any em-
ployer, the commission may, in its discretion, for cause shown
exempt any employee or class of employees from these provi-
sions. During emergency periods of not to exceed four weeks
in the aggregate in any calendar year, the commission may, in
its discretion, allow longer period of employment for such fe-
male employees under such general rules and regulations as the
commission may prescribe and adopt.
125. See text accompanying notes 7-12 supra.
126. See Brown et aL, supra note 3, at 927.
127. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
128. MiNm. STAT. §§ 181.41 & .43 (1971), prohibiting boys and girls
under certain ages from being employed in specific occupations and at
certain hours will -require revision to provide equal legislative protec-
tion for both boys and girls.
129. See TE PREsiDEms CoMMIsSION ON THE STATUS OF WomEN,
REPORT OF TE COMnTrE ON PROTECTIE LABOR LEGrsLATION 9 (1963);
PREsIDNT's COIVnmIIssION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, AmmucAN WOmAN
37 (1963).
130. See REPORT OF TEE MINNESOTA GOVERNOR'S COIMMvISSION ON THE
STATUS OF Woi'N at B-7 (1965).
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or less, a maximum eight hour workday, s13 and premium pay for
work beyond 40 hours a week. 132  Other commentators have
agreed with the principle that maximum hours legislation is a
necessary protective measure and that such laws should be re-
vised to include men as well as women rather than being struck
down entirely. 83  Coupling maximum hours legislation with
premium pay legislation would provide an effective deterrent to
long, forced hours of labor, 3 4 and would also allow for those em-
ployees who desired to work overtime. 85
b. Weight, Health and Safety Regulations
Minnesota health and safety regulations which would be
threatened by the Equal Rights mandate include section 183.25,
which prohibits female foundry workers from lifting cores in
excess of 25 pounds; 186 section 183.24, which prohibits women
from placing cores into ovens or taking them out regardless of
the core's weight;187 section 182.09, which prohibits women from
oiling and cleaning moving machinery; 38 section 182.06, which
requires that "where women are employed, or where it is deemed
necessary by the department, stairways shall be built solid and
without openings between the treads;"'3 9 and section 182.44,
which provides that women shall be provided with seats and,
where possible, seats with backs in all places where women are
employed. 40
131. See REPORT OF THE COMVnT ON PROTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLATION,
supra note 129, at 11 (1963).
132. Id. at 9.
133. A representative of the Minnesota Department of Labor and
Industry has noted that the Department receives numerous complaints
about forced overtime from both men and women.
Mrs. Myra K. Wolfgang in her testimony before the Senate Sub-
committee on Constitutional Amendments reported that in Michigan
there was a three month period when there were no hours laws due to
legislative mistake. She testified that during that period the Chrysler
Motor Co. put its women on a schedule of 12 hours a day, seven days a
week, until some workers had to quit. See Hearings, supra note 108,
at 327.
134. See THE PRESmENT's COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN,
AMERIcAN WOMAN 36 (1963).
135. MINN. STAT. § 181.24 (1971) presently provides for a "stand-
ard" work day of 10 hours for both sexes beyond which all labor ap-
parently must be voluntary. There is no limitation on the number of
days per week.
136. MINN. STAT. § 183.25 (1971).
137. MINN. STAT. § 183.24 (1971).
138. MINN. STAT. § 182.09 (1971).
139. MINN. STAT. § 182.06 (1971).
140. Mn'N. STAT. § 182.44 (1971).
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The legislature must analyze all of these statutes to deter-
mine whether the protections provided are necessary, and if so,
for whom Certainly the weight lifting statute' 41 should not be
extended to include all men as well as all women. However, it
may be desirable to fashion a physical requirements test that
must be passed by every employee before he or she is allowed to
lift such weights. Such a test would assure that a strong woman
would not be precluded from holding a job which required heavy
lifting. Similar tests could be created to discover whether the
individual possesses those physical attributes which underlie the
laws precluding women from placing cores into ovens142 and
prohibiting women from cleaning moving machinery.143 On the
other hand, the legislature may decide merely to repeal these
laws without any reenactment. The law which requires closed
stairways in places where women work 44 should be placed in
this latter category. The legislature should also consider ex-
tending the benefits of women's protective labor legislation to
men; for example, the legislature might determine that seats be
required for both men and women where practicable. 14 5
Certainly the legislature's response to the Equal Rights
Amendment should not be to abolish employment health and
safety regulations; there is every indication that employee health
and safety continue to be jeopardized in American industry. 4 0
It is perhaps time for the state, as it revises these laws, to pro-
vide protection for all workers, male as well as female.
B. UNxE1MLOYMENT CoiPENsATIoN
The Minnesota Unemployment Compensation law's general
eligibility test is that an unemployed worker be "available" for
and "able" to work.147 The principal disqualification provisions
relate to voluntary discontinuance of employment 48 or discharge
for misconduct.149 However, the Minnesota disqualification for
pregnancy covers women who voluntarily remove themselves
from the labor force and women who are discharged or given a
141. MNN. STAT. § 183.25 (1971).
142. Mhn.. STAT. § 183.24 (1971).
143. MixN. STAT. § 182.09 (1971).
144. M il. STAT. § 182.06 (1971).
145. See ineN. STAT. § 182.44 (1971).
146. See generally F. WA.L cR TaE AErv cm Womm: AN EN-
DANGERE SpEcIEs (1972).
147. MiNu. STAT. § 268.08(3) (1971).
148. Mn . STAT. § 268.09(1) (1971).
149. Mim. STAT. § 268.09(1) (1971).
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mandatory leave of absence because of pregnancy. 1 0 Thus, the
general test of eligibility, availability and ableness to work, is not
applied to the woman who has been involuntarily laid off be-
cause of her pregnancy. This pregnancy disqualification is un-
like any other disqualification provision in the law. All other
disqualifications relate to an individual's willingness and ability
to work or to his or her misconduct on the job. The disqualifi-
cation clearly discriminates against women because it is appli-
cable to any woman who is discharged or forced to take a leave
of absence, regardless of an individual woman's ability to con-
tinue at her job.
It could be argued that this disqualification falls within the
"uniqueness" exception to the Equal Rights Amendment"' since
pregnancy is a condition endemic to women. An indication of
judicial response to both the challenge of the disqualification
and the defense of unique characteristics can be found in two de-
cisions invalidating compulsory maternity leave regulations,
which are based on the same unique physical characteristic. A
federal district court in Texas recently struck down such a regu-
lation as discriminatory against women under Title VII, 15 2 and
another court reached the same result on equal protection
grounds.1 5 3 It is likely that the Minnesota unemployment com-
pensation exclusion would be subjected to a similar analysis.
The recommendation of the Committee on Social Insurance
and Taxes of the President's Commission on the Status of Women
provides a guideline for legislative revision of section 268.09(2):
Disqualifications from unemployment compensation in respect
to pregnancy and maternity should be based on reasonable tests
of the ability and capacity of the individual to work and should
not be determined by arbitrary time periods before and after
birth which do not fit the variation in physical ability of
women workers, in types of job, and in working conditions.' 54
A statute modeled on this recommendation would provide preg-
nant women with adequate health protection and at the same
150. MIN. STAT. § 268.09(2) (1971). The provision states: "If such
individual is separated from his employment because of pregnancy
151. See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
152. Schattmen v. Texas Employment Commission, 3 FEP Cases
311 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 1971), 3 FEP Cases 468 (W.D. Tex. April 16,
1971).
153. Cohen v. Chesterfield Cty. School Bd., 39 U.S.L.W. 2686 (E.D.
Va. May 17, 1971). See also Brown et al., supra note 3, at 930.
154. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL INSURANCE AND TAXES 40-55, Recommendation
5 (1963).
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time would afford individual women the benefits accorded other
workers in our society.
IV. CRIMINAL LAW
A ADULTERY AND FoIumcATIoN
The Minnesota adultery statute provides that a married
woman and any man other than her husband are guilty of adul-
tery if they have sexual intercourse. 15 The penalty for this
felony is imprisonment for not more than one year and/or a fine
of not more than $1,000.156 The fornication statute provides that
a single woman and any man are guilty of fornication if they
have sexual intercourse. 57  Fornication is a misdemeanor. 53
The Minnesota fornication and adultery statutes do not pro-
vide for the equal treatment required under the Equal Rights
Amendment' 59 The statutes assume that a married woman who
has sexual intercourse with a man not her husband will always
be guilty of adultery and subject to the more severe penalty for
that crime; whereas a married man who engages in sexual inter-
course with a woman not his wife may be guilty of adultery or
fornication depending on the marital status of the female. A
single woman can never be charged with adultery, but can be
charged with fornication; a married woman can never be charged
with fornication, but may be found guilty of adultery; and both
single and married men may be found guilty of adultery or for-
nication depending solely on the marital status of the female
partner. 60 Thus, men and women who commit essentially the
same crime are subject to vastly different penalties."5'
155. MxNN. STAT. § 609.36 (1971).
156. Id.
157. Mrnxr. STAT. § 609.34 (1971).
158. Id.
159. See text accompanying notes 5-12 supra.
160. Adultery statutes in the United States generally fall into
two categories-those which are based upon the canon law and those
which are based upon the English common law. The canon law, ap-
plied by the Ecclesiastical Courts of England, condemned adultery as a
violation of the marriage vow. Thus, when a married person had sexual
intercourse with a single person, the act was adultery on the part of
the married person and fornication on the part of the single person
regardless of the sex of either. Under the English common law, on the
other hand, adultery was significant only as it tended to expose a hus-
band to the maintenance of another man's children and to the claims
of spurious offspring upon his estate. Thus, the courts were concerned
primarily with preventing sexual intercourse between a man and any
married woman. See W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, Canvms § 11.04 (6th
ed. 1958); R. PERE Ns, PERKNs oN CRnNAL LAw 377 (2d ed. 1969).
161. For instancei a married man who has sexual intercourse with
a single woman can only be charged with fornication, whereas a married
1973]
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If it determined that the state has an interest in maintaining
such laws,16 2 the Legislature may look to several states for non-
discriminatory adultery and fornication statutes. Illinois and
Michigan are two jurisdictions that have enacted nondiscrimina-
tory definitions of adultery.'6 3  The Illinois statute provides:
Any person who cohabits or has sexual intercourse with an-
other not his spouse commits adultery, if the behavior is open
and notorious, and (1) the person is married and the other per-
son involved in such intercourse is not his spouse; or (2) the
person is not married and knows that the other person involved
in such intercourse is married.'04
The Michigan statute is somewhat less complex in wording, pro-
viding:
Adultery is the sexual intercourse of two persons, either of
whom is married to a third person 6 5
A statute constitutionally defining fornication could simply
read:
When any single man and single woman have sexual inter-
course with each other, each is guilty of fornication.
The Legislature might, of course, wish to consider removing for-
nication from the criminal statutes altogether.
woman who has sexual intercourse with a single man can be charged
with adultery.
If this law and other criminal statutes discussed in this section
are not revised by the legislature upon ratification of the Equal Rights
Amendment, persons convicted under these statutes would have an ex-
cellent chance of getting their convictions overturned on the ground
that the statutes are unconstitutional. See Brown et al., supra note 3,
at 915.
162. See Comment to 38 ILL. ANN. STAT. § 11-7 (1972):
Adultery involves an affront to a specific marriage relation-
ship, in addition to an affront to the institution of marriage in
general. It was felt that this more seriously offends the publicgeace. Moreover, there is an added element of danger created
y the adulterous relationship in that the aggrieved spouse may
create a tumultuous and dangerous situation in seeking his pri-
vate vengeance. (See City of Chicago v. Murray, 333 Ill. App.
233, [77] N.E.2d [452] (1947) .... )
But see Advisory Committee Comment to MINN. STAT. § 609.36 (1954),
which noted that the American Law Institute had recommended that
adultery not be made a crime.
163. ILL. ANN. STAT. § 11-7 (1972); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.-
29 (1968).
164. ILL. ANN. STAT. § 11-7 (1972). The Minnesota Advisory Com-
mittee to the 1963 Criminal Code noted that a majority of the Commit-
tee felt that the Minnesota adultery law should be revised in the man-
ner of the Illinois statute. See Advisory Committee Comment to
mN. STAT. § 609.36 (1954).
165. MtcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 750.29 (1968).
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B. STATUTORY RAPE
In Minnesota, a person having sexual intercourse with a fe-
male under 18 years old not his wife is guilty of statutory rape.1 66
Sentence ranges from one to thirty years, depending upon the
age of the female victim. 167 The only Minnesota statute cover-
ing young males who are sexually assaulted by females is the
indecent liberties statute which protects only children under the
age of 16 and which provides a maximum penalty of only seven
years.' 68 The age of lawful consent to sexual activity also dif-
fers under this statutory framework. There is no consent ex-
ception in the statutory rape statute, which applies only to young
females.16 9 Young men over the age of 16, however, are deemed
capable of giving such consent to heterosexual intercourse. 170
The legislature seems to have determined that females under the
age of 18 are incapable of giving meaningful consent to sexual
intercourse whereas males are capable of such consent at age
16.
Such inequality in protection under the law would be sub-
ject to question upon ratification of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment. Although it may be argued that this statutory scheme is
constitutional under the unique physical characteristics test,17'
the real discrimination in the statutes arises from the differing
ages of consent to sexual acts.172  Therefore, the legislature
should decide at what age a person can, in fact, give meaningful
consent. Further, provision should be made for the statutory
rape of young males.
166. Mnvw. STAT. § 609.295 (1971).
167. Id.
168. MnmN. STAT. § 609.296 (1971) provides:
Subdivision 1. Whoever takes indecent liberties with a
person not his spouse, without the latter's consent expressly
given, may be sentenced as follows:(1) If the person upon whom the indecent liberties are
taken suffers great bodily harm as a result of the indecent lib-
erties, to imprisonment for not more than ten years;(2) In any other case, to imprisonment for not more than
four years.
Subd. 2. Whoever takes indecent liberties with any child
under the age of 16 years or induces any child under the age
of 16 years to perform an indecent act, may be sentenced to
imprisonment for not more than seven years. For prosecutions
commenced pursuant to the provisions of this subdivision, it
shall be no defense that the child consented to such acts or in-
decent liberties.
169. AIum. STAT. § 609.295 (1971).
170. Neither males nor females under the age of 18 can consent to
homosexual acts. Mxx&. STAT. § 609.293 (4) (1971).
171. See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
172. See generally Brown et al,, supra note 3, at 958,
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C. CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT
Section 609.375173 provides that a person is guilty of non-
support if he is legally obligated to provide support to his wife
or child and he knowingly fails without lawful excuse to do so.
Penalties including a possible five year sentence are provided. 17'
If it can be properly assumed that the statute is subject to the
interpretation given its predecessors,' 75 only men are subject to
criminal penalties. Thus, the support law imposes a duty on
men it does not impose on women and, since it does not fall
within the exceptions to the Amendment, 176 it would likely be
found unconstitutional. The legislature should revise this sec-
tion along with revision of the civil support statute.177 If the
civil support statute 178 is revised to provide that husband and
wife both have support obligations inter se and to their children,
section 609.375 need only be revised to provide that:
Whoever is legally obligated to provide care and support to his
spouse or his child, whether or not its custody has been granted
to another, and knowingly omits and fails without lawful ex-
cuse to do so is guilty of nonsupport of said spouse or child,
as the case may be, and upon conviction thereof may be sen-
tenced to imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to pay-
ment of a fine of not more than $300.179
Such a revision would conform to the mandate of the Amend-
ment and would complement the proposed equalization of the
support duty between husband and wife.
8 0
V. EXEMPTION FROM JURY SERVICE' 8 '
Although all states grant women the right to be a juror, 23
states, including Minnesota, provide special exemptions for
173. MINN. STAT. § 609.375 (1971).
174. Id.
175. The Attorney General of Minnesota, interpreting a predecessor
statute, held that a mother's desertion of her child did not amount to
child abandonment since the father had the primary responsibility for
support and maintenance of children. Op. ATT'Y GEN. no. 10, 56 (1924).
176. See text accompanying notes 5-12 supra.
177. See text accompanying notes 25-45 supra.
178. MINN. STAT. § 518.05 (1971).
179. The remainder of section 609.375 could be revised to conform to
the language suggested to replace subsection (1).
180. See text accompanying notes 25-45 supra.
181. Under the common law, jury service was confined to males.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *362. It was only with the enfran-
chisement of women in 1920 that a large number of states began to
extend jury service to women. Before the passage of the 19th amend-
ment, only California, Kansas, Michigan, Nevada, Utah, and Washing-
ton had granted women both the right to vote and the right to serve on
a jury. Soon after the passage of the 19th amendment, a majority of
states enacted legislation providing for jury service for women. See
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women 8 2 not provided to men.18 3 The Minnesota statute is not
unlike that of a number of states in both its history and word-
ing.'8 4 The statute provides in part that "any woman drawn
upon either a grand or petit jury may, in the discretion of the
court, be excused from such jury service upon request."18 5 The
legislature may have provided the exemption for a number of
reasons. Traditionally, women were considered to be socially
unfit for the environs of the courtroom. The argument that the
legislature felt family life would suffer as a result of a woman's
absence from the home is supported by the existence of statutes
in other states which specifically provide exemptions for child
care and household duties.'8 6
Because the Minnesota exemption provides special treatment
for women, it would be in violation of the general mandate of the
Amendment. 8 7 The legislature should therefore consider re-
vising the jury duty statute. 88 Many of the assumptions upon
Note, Jury Service for Women, 12 U. FLA. L. R1Ev. 224 (1959); Comment,
51 MINN. L. lEv. 442 (1967). While it is likely that such extensions
were the result of a general agitation in favor of women's rights,
many women automatically became eligible for jury service as a re-
sult of state laws which provided that all legal voters were qualified to
be jurors.
At present, no state excludes women from jury service. As late as
1962, however, there were still three states which prohibited women
from serving on juries. See PRESIDENT's ComzmnsSIo ON Ta STATUS
OF WOMEN, REPORT OF =s CommuTrE ON CivuL AND PoLrrcAl RIGHTS
11 (1963). In fact, it was only with the advent of the Civil Rights Act
of 1957 that women secured the right to sit on federal juries.
182. See Hearings on S.J.Res. 61, supra note 102, at 725.
183. Thus the statute will in all likelihood be invalidated after rat-
ification. See text accompanying notes 5-12 supra.
184. See Hearings on S.J.Res.61, supra note 102, at 725.
185. mNx. STAT. § 628.49 (1971).
186. See Hearings on S.J. Res 61, supra note 102, at 725.
187. See text accompanying notes 5-12 supra. In 1961, the United
States Supreme Court in Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), upheld the
constitutionality of a Florida statute which required women, but not
men, to register with the clerk of court in order to be eligible for jury
duty. It seems probable that the Court would have come to a similar
result if the Minnesota exemption provision were challenged on equal
protection grounds, although there is some doubt as to whether the
Court would uphold Hoyt today. See Brown et al., supra note 3.
188. The Minnesota Governor's Commission on the Status of Women
has recommended that the legislature amend MINN. STAT. § 628.49.
See REPORT OF T= MnqN oTA GovERNOR'S COMISSION ON THE STATUS
OF WOEn at D-2 (1965). The Committee on Civil and Political Rights
of the President's Commission on the Status of Women noted that the
Committee believed that there was an urgent need for state legislative
reform with respect to jury service eligibility, exemption, and excuse
in order to achieve equal jury service in the states. See REPoRr or T
CoNnvrrra OF PROTEcTrm LABOR LEGISLATION, supra note 129, at 12
(1963).
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which special exemptions were based have lost their validity.
One commentator argues that it is somewhat anomalous to per-
mit women to determine that jury duty is "inconsistent with
[their] own special responsibilities" when the special responsi-
bilities of men often include holding a job and providing a fam-
ily's income."' Further, the law does not distinguish those
women who have a home and family to care for from those who
do not. The exemption provision could easily be revised to con-
form with the Amendment and retain provisions deemed to be
of social utility. The present statute allows both men and
women ample opportunity to request relief from duty in such
situations as family sickness, personal illness and other hardship
situations.190 If parental child care is deemed a social value out-
weighing civic responsibilities, the legislature might specifically
provide exemption for child care by either father or mother. 19 1
On the other hand, the legislature might wish to provide in-
creased jurors' fees to cover the cost of day care.'9 2
VI. CONCLUSION
The Equal Rights Amendment has been sent to the states
189. See L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REv-
OLUTION 30 (1969).
190. MINN. STAT. § 628.49 (1971) provides:
The court shall not excuse from service upon either grand
or petit jury any person duly drawn and summoned, except upon
the ground that he is either physically or mentally unable or
unfit, in the opinion of the court, to attend or serve as a juror,
or by reason of serious sickness of some immediate member of
his family, or there is a showing and the court believes that
extraordinary hardship will result if one summoned is not ex-
cused; provided, in counties having more than two terms of
court a year the court may, for other sufficient causes, excuse
a juror from service for which he was so drawn and summoned
until a later term of court or period during the same year, and
in such case such juror shall report for service and serve at such
later term or period with the same force and effect as though
he had been regularly drawn and summoned for such later
term or period.
The Governor's Commission on the Status of Women has declared
that it feels this is sufficient for women as well as men. See note 130
supra.
191. Such an approach was recommended by the President's Com-
mission Committee on Civil and Political Rights, REPoRT, supra note
181, at 14, which reports that such a provision already exists in the laws
of California, Colorado, Michigan, Montana, and New Jersey.
192. MiNN. STAT. § 357.26(1) (1971) provides a $10 juror's fee for
each day of attendance in court and a $6 a day attendance fee for
courts in counties which contain a city of the first class. In addition to
the $6 fee a mileage allowance is provided. Whether this is sufficient
to cover the current cost of child care is open to argument. It is un-
likely that such a fee covers the loss of income for most persons.
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for ratification. If it is approved by the requisite 38 states, the
legislature of the State of Minnesota will then have two years
within which to conform a small number of important statutes.
Since the few statutes which require substantive revision would
almost certainly be subject to judicial challenge in their present
form, the task facing the legislature is important. Even if the
Amendment should fail to be ratified, the legislature should
make the recommended statutory changes. Such action would
be consistent with the expressed policies of the legislature re-
garding equality of rights. Within the framework of equaliza-
tion, the legislature has the opportunity to substantively reform
many areas of Minnesota law to achieve more equitable treat-
ment for the men and women of the state.

